In this paper, the author revisits “the emotive theory of value” and argues that values are not entities but nothing other than “linguistic fictions”. Accordingly, valuations—i.e., valuing actions—can be defined as approving or disapproving attitudes of a subject to some object. In this perspective, values cannot be true or false: What we can do is just compare them with regard to strength. As a consequence, value judgments are to be understood as sentences which are used either to say that a (...) subject s values an object o positively or negatively, or to express (evince) a valuation. The author then shows some relations between normative and evaluative discourses. First, he claims that norms as well as valuations are not true or false. Second, he argues that both may be explained or justified, even if the former are usually justified teleologically whereas the latter are explained referring back to the subject's background and life‐style. Third, he notes that a legal order originates from the fact that valuations “crystallize” into norms. Finally, the author examines some further questions related to his analysis. In particular, he argues that the different realms of values, e.g., morals, aesthetics, politics, etc., do not correspond to different evaluative attitudes, but to different phenomena and diverse spheres of human life. (shrink)

E.O. Wright, using the labourtransfer and game theory approach of J. Roemer, provides a general framework for a comparative analysis of the different class systems, the historical variations of which are founded on the peculiar nature of the "asset" the dominant class appropriates.

The long-awaited revision of the industry standard on phylogenetics Since the publication of the first edition of this landmark volume more than twenty-five years ago, phylogenetic systematics has taken its place as the dominant paradigm of systematic biology. It has profoundly influenced the way scientists study evolution, and has seen many theoretical and technical advances as the field has continued to grow. It goes almost without saying that the next twenty-five years of phylogenetic research will prove as fascinating as the (...) first, with many exciting developments yet to come. This new edition of Phylogenetics captures the very essence of this rapidly evolving discipline. Written for the practicing systematist and phylogeneticist, it addresses both the philosophical and technical issues of the field, as well as surveys general practices in taxonomy. Major sections of the book deal with the nature of species and higher taxa, homology and characters, trees and tree graphs, and biogeography—the purpose being to develop biologically relevant species, character, tree, and biogeographic concepts that can be applied fruitfully to phylogenetics. The book then turns its focus to phylogenetic trees, including an in-depth guide to tree-building algorithms. Additional coverage includes: Parsimony and parsimony analysis Parametric phylogenetics including maximum likelihood and Bayesian approaches Phylogenetic classification Critiques of evolutionary taxonomy, phenetics, and transformed cladistics Specimen selection, field collecting, and curating Systematic publication and the rules of nomenclature Providing a thorough synthesis of the field, this important update to Phylogenetics is essential for students and researchers in the areas of evolutionary biology, molecular evolution, genetics and evolutionary genetics, paleontology, physical anthropology, and zoology. (shrink)

Each group of selections in this text book is preceded by about ten pages of commentary by Harrington. These commentaries can be read either before the selections as a preparation setting forth the issues, or after the selections as an elucidation, isolating the selection's central concerns. All the selections, with the exception of Kierkegaard's, are from twentieth century thinkers. The contributors include Tillich, Herberg, G. E. Wright, Bultmann, D. M. Bailie, J. J. C. Smart, Wisdom, Hare, Sartre, Barth and (...) Vahanian. The book is divided into three main parts. The first part is basically doctrinal, exploring Biblical themes and contemporary views of revelation, God, man, Jesus, crucifixion, resurrection, and incarnation. The second part deals with aspects of the philosophy of religion including the connection between philosophy and theology, religious language, the existence of God, theistic proofs, and epistemological considerations. The third part, under the heading of "Challenges to Contemporary Man," is a potpourri of theological glamor issues including Existentialism and the death of God. Very often Harrington's commentary provides the reader with the classical aspects of the problem which the contemporary contributer is dealing with. There is a topically organized bibliography of suggested reading. There is no index.--S. O. H. (shrink)

The aim of this study was to explore neonatal nurses’and mothers of preterm infants’experiences of daily challenges. Interviews took place asking for good, bad and challenging experiences. Data were analysed using qualitative content analysis and findings were clustered in two categories: good and challenging experiences, each containing three themes. The good experiences were: managing with success as a nurse, small things matter for mothers, and a good day anyhow for mothers and nurses. The challenging experiences were: mothering in public, being (...) pulled between responsibilities, and adverse things stick under the nurses’skin. The study shows that small daily clinical matters become big issues and could lead to moral distress, and that nurses integrate ethics of justice and ethics of care while mothers are concerned about health and well-being of their specific infant only. The challenge for nursing to integrate fairness and sensitive care in family-oriented neonatal care is discussed. (shrink)

Written over the last 18 months of his life and inspired by his interest in G. E. Moore's defence of common sense, this much discussed volume collects Wittgenstein's reflections on knowledge and certainty, on what it is to know a proposition for sure.

The vexed question of the exact significance of the name of Mavortius in the old Putean MS. of Prudentius has again been called into court in the recent discussions of the Mavortian recension of Horace, and is fully treated in Dr. Bick's Horazkritik seit 1880, pp. 31–35. As Dr. Bick has done me the honour of subjecting my former articles on the question to his criticism, I feel called upon to say something in defence of the view I maintained. I (...) willingly grant him that perhaps I laid too strong a stress on the connection of the question with Horatian criticism; but I do so, I fear, not as a convert to his arguments in favour of the view that Put. is merely a copy of a MS. that had Mavortius' autograph written in it, and that therefore that name is part of a lost subscriptio, but precisely for the contrary reason, that I consider I was too much influenced by former advocates of that view. That there is no ground for assuming the name to be part of a lost subscriptio I am more than ever convinced, and my object here is to endeavour to show that the whole argument based on a false premise. (shrink)

I venture to call the attention of classical scholars to two legends about Roman Emperors gleaned amid the arid waste of theological nonsense which passed for literature among the Copts, in the hope that they may have better luck than I have had in tracing them to some classical source. The first is taken from MS. Par. Copte 131, fol. 40, a single leaf of what seems to be a geographical and historical encyclopaedia.1 The writer who is treating in a (...) very discursive way of Ethiopia, states that Nero or Domitian—a strange pair to run in double harness—caused an island in the Red Sea to be watered with oil. The description of that island is mixed up with a mention of the original divisions of the Indians—a term which as usual in early days embraces both Indians and Ethiopians,—and their subsequent changes; and as that too may be of interest to students of ancient geography, I will translate the passage in full. (shrink)

I DO not think that it is at all generally known that among the Egyptian antiquities given by Grant Bey to the Museum at Aberdeen there are a considerable number of papyrus fragments, Greek, Coptic,1 Hieratic, Demotic, and even Latin and Arabic, which except for an inspection by Prof. Sayce and a passing visit of Dr. Grenfell have up till now been left unexamined. That indeed is my only reason for trespassing in a branch of Palaeography with which I am (...) quite unfamiliar; and it is in the hope of inciting some experienced papyrologist to turn his attention to them that I publish the following fragments. In the case of the Greek fragments lack of time combined with a mistrust of my powers of deciphering the more illegible non-literary hands forbade me do more than select the most promising literary fragments. Among these Homer naturally predominates; but the gem of the collection is a lyric fragment, which may fairly certainly be ascribed to Alcaeus, though Dr. Grenfell who first noticed it attributed it to Sappho. A fragment of Demosthenes, a fragment of Dioscorides, and a vellum fragment of a Latin Bible, were the only others which I succeeded in identifying; but these, with the few tragic, comic, and medical fragments which I also reproduce, are, I think, first-fruits sufficient to show that the crop would not be barren, if it found a competent gleaner. (shrink)

En "Legal Reasons, Sources and Gaps", Raz señala que las lagunas jurídicas existen sólo cuando el derecho habla con voz incierta o cuando habla con muchas voces, pero que no hay lagunas cuando el derecho guarda silencio. En este último caso habría reglas de clausura, analíticamente verdaderas, que impiden la ocurrencia de esas lagunas. Según Raz, si hay una laguna en un sistema jurídico, entonces no es verdadero ni falso que exista una razón concluyente para ejecutar cierta acción. Así, una (...) de las contribuciones más importantes de Raz a la solución del problema de las lagunas jurídicas es subrayar que el discurso jurídico no está completamente controlado por la bivalencia. Sin embargo, a menudo se sostiene que el rechazo de la bivalencia conduce a contradicciones. Si esta afirmación fuese verdadera, entonces la solución de Raz al problema de las lagunas jurídicas se vería seriamente amenazada. En este artículo mostramos, con ayuda de una herramienta analítica sofisticada, i.e., la lógica de la verdad de G.H. von Wright, que el rechazo de la bivalencia sólo nos compromete a aceptar la conclusión trivial de que puede haber proposiciones que no son verdaderas ni falsas. Por esta razón, el trabajo de Raz todavía puede ser considerado un buen punto de partida para analizar las relaciones entre normas, razonamiento práctico y lagunas jurídicas. Sin embargo, también mostramos que para admitir proposiciones que no son verdaderas ni falsas, las tesis de Raz deben ser reformuladas. De otra manera, la tesis de que no existen lagunas cuando el derecho guarda silencio no sería compatible con el rechazo de la bivalencia. /// In his paper "Legal Reasons, Sources and Gaps", Raz says that legal gaps only exist when law speaks with uncertain voice or when it speaks with many voices, but there are no gaps when law is silent. In this later case, rules of closure, which are analytically true, prevent from the occurrence of gaps. According to Raz, if there is a gap in a legal system, then both the claim that there is a conclusive legal reason to perform a certain action, and its negation are neither true nor false. Therefore, one of the Raz's most important contributions to the solution of the problem of legal gaps is to remark that legal discourse is not altogether governed by the principie of bivalence. However, philosophers often claim that the denial of bivalence leads to a logical inconsistency. If this claim were true, then Raz's solution to the problem of gaps would be seriously threatened. In this paper we show--with the aid of a sophisticated analytical tool, i.e., von Wright's truth-logic--that the rejection of bivalence only commits us to accept the trivial conclusion that propositions can lack truth-values. For this reason, Raz's paper can still be regarded as a good starting-point for analyzing the relationships between norms, practical reasoning and legal gaps. However, we also show that in order to admit propositions which are neither true nor false, Raz's theses must be reformulated. Otherwise, the claim that there is no gap when law is silent would not be compatible with the rejection of bivalence. (shrink)

One of the central issue of developmental biology concerns the molecular mechanisms whereby a multipotent cell gives rise to distinct differentiated progeny. Differences between specialised cell types reflect variations in their patterns of gene expression. The regulation of transcription initiation is an important control point for gene expression and it is, therefore, not surprising that transcription factors play a pivotal role in mammalian development and differentiation.Haemopoiesis offers a uniquely tractable system for the study of lineage commitment and differentiation. The importance (...) of transcription factor in the normal regulation of haemopoiesis is underlined by the frequency with which transcription factors are targeted by leukaemogenic mutations. Studies of the function and regulation of haemopoietic transcription factors, especially those expressed in lineage‐restricted patterns, should greatly increase our understanding of the molecular control of haemopoiesis. In this review we have focused on insights provided by recent studies of the GATA and SCL proteins. (shrink)